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Abstract 
Despite suggestions in the literature that the semantics of many might be the key for 
understanding children’s non-adult-like interpretations of quantified sentences (cf. 
Drozd 2001, Geurts 2003), experimental data on the acquisition of weak quantifiers 
like many is rare.  This paper investigates children’s comprehension of weak (many) 
versus strong (many of, all) quantifiers in English. In particular, by means of a truth-
value judgment task, taking the semantic and syntactic characteristics of many into 
account, we tested whether 28 children aged between four and seven understand the 
ambiguous nature of many as described in the literature (Partee, 1988) and whether 
they transfer this ambiguity to many of and all. The results show that children have 
an ambiguous quantifier system for both strong and weak quantifiers. This runs 
counter the idea that the child always prefers a reading of many in which the 
arguments seem to ‘switch’ (as for adults in Many French have won the Tour de 
France, resulting in the interpretation Many Tour de France winners are French), as 
predicted by Drozd and Van Loosbroek’s (1999) Weak Quantification Hypothesis. 
On the basis of our experimental results on children’s understanding of both weak 
and strong quantifiers, we conclude that children’s non-adult interpretations of 
quantified sentences are due to the ambiguous nature of (weak) quantifiers. This 
presents the language learner with the difficult, but necessary, task to distinguish 
between those different kinds of readings and understand their different semantic 
and syntactic representations in order to converge with the target language. 
1. Introduction 
Since Inhelder and Piaget’s (1964) groundbreaking work, it has been 
known that children, regardless of their language, have difficulties in 
understanding quantified sentences, e.g. Is every cowboy riding a horse? in 
relation to figure 1 (cf. Freeman, Sinha, and Stedmon (1982), Roeper and 
de Villiers (1993), Philip (1995), Crain, Thornton, Boster, Conway, Lillo-
Martin, and Woodams (1996), Brooks and Braine (1996), Drozd (2001), 
Geurts (2003), Hollebrandse and Smits (2006), Drozd and Van Loosbroek 
(2006)). Children aged between four and seven answer ‘no’ and point at the 
horse with no cowboy as if they take the sentence to mean “Is every horse 
being ridden by a cowboy?”. This results in a ‘no, not that one’ answer. 
The difficulties that children have with quantified sentences disappear after 
the age of seven. 
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Recently, Drozd and Van Loosbroek (1999) and Drozd (2001), 
claimed that the child’s answer results from a reading of the strong 
quantifier every similar to the so-called ‘switched’ reading adults allow for 
the weak quantifier many in (1) (i.e. reading (1b), first observed by 









Figure 1: Is every cowboy riding a horse? 
 
(1) Many French have won the Tour de France 
 a.  “Many French have won the Tour de France” 
 b.  “Many of the Tour de France winners are French” 
In contradiction to the regular cardinal reading of (1) exemplified in (1a), 
for reading (1b), the first argument (‘French’) and second argument (Tour 
de France winners) of the quantifier many, seem to switch. This results in a 
reading according to which one might judge sentence (1) as true given the 
fact that, compared to the distribution of Tour de France participants per 
country, relatively many winners are French. In a similar way, children are 
argued to interpret Is every cowboy riding a horse as questioning the 
distribution of all horse-riders per animal. Children then answer in terms of 
their expectation, that, of all horse-riders, cowboys relatively most often 
ride a horse. Crucially, however, in this case, not all horses are being 
ridden by a cowboy. This runs counter the child’s expectation and results in 
a ‘no, not that one answer’ (Drozd and Van Loosbroek, 1999 and Drozd , 
2001). 
In order to become adult-like, the child’s task is then to only allow 
such a reading for weak quantifiers like many. To be more specific, Drozd 
and Van Loosbroek (1999) and Drozd (2001) imply that children have to 
disambiguate every from this switched reading to become adult-like. This 
suggests a developmental stage in the acquisition of quantification in which 
children allow switched readings for both many and every. However, while 
earlier experimental work regarding the acquisition of quantifiers focused 
on strong quantifiers like every and all (cf. the literature mentioned earlier), 
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experimental data on children’s understanding of weak and strong 
quantifiers in experimental contexts similar to the situation described in (1)  
is rare (but with the exception of Krämer, 2005a, 2005b and Hollebrandse 
and Smits, 2006). This paper presents an experiment testing children’s 
understanding of the ambiguous nature of many, and moreover, addresses 
the question whether children allow similar readings for the strong 
quantifiers many of and all to those that they allow for many. By analyzing 
children’s interpretations of many in contexts similar to (1), we will 
identify an appropriate characterization of this quantifier for children and 
relate this to the acquisition of quantification. 
2. The switched reading of many 
Given the relevancy of the switched reading to the acquisition of 
quantification (as argued by Drozd and Van Loosbroek, 1999 and Drozd, 
2001), the question arises what the actual nature is of this switched reading 
of many. We will now discuss three accounts of the switched reading that 
are given in the literature. 
2.1 The switched reading as a focus affected reading 
Herburger (1997, 2001) argues that the switched reading is an instance of a 
‘focus affected reading’. Given the fact that the switched reading is only 
possible with a weak quantifier (cf. the examples below containing the 
strong quantifiers many of and all and their infelicitous interpretations (2b) 
and (3b)), she takes the difference between weak and strong quantifiers as a 
starting point.  
(2) a. Many of the French have won the Tour de France 
 b. *“Many of the winners of the Tour de France are French” 
(3) a. All French have won the Tour de France 
 b. *“All winners of the Tour de France are French” 
In Generalized Theory (Barwise and Cooper, 1981), weak quantifiers differ 
from strong quantifiers in the way they relate their arguments (the 
denotation of the NP and the VP). Weak quantifiers present an intersection 
relation between their first argument (the denotation of the NP) and second 
argument (the denotation of the VP), whereas strong quantifiers present a 
subset relation. In Keenan’s (1987) words, weak quantifiers like many and 
two are symmetrical and strong quantifiers like every and all are not.  This 
is exemplified below in which the NP ‘men’ is taken as the quantifier’s 
first argument and the VP ‘x are laughing’ as its second argument.  
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(4) a.  Many men are laughing <=> Many laughing x are men 
 b. Two men are laughing <=> Two laughing x are men 
This difference between weak and strong quantifiers, Herburger argues, 
explains why only weak quantifiers allow a switched reading. This is 
illustrated in (5) and (6). While switching the arguments of a weak 
quantifier like two in (5) does not result in a difference in meaning, it does 
for a strong quantifier like all in (6). 
(5) Two parrots are wearing a hat <=>Two hat-wearers are parrots 
(6) All parrots are wearing a hat <=/=> All hat-wearers are parrots 
Assuming a certain mapping from syntax to semantics, Herburger assumes 
that the semantic difference between weak and strong quantifiers is also 
reflected in the syntax. She suggests that weak quantifiers undergo Q-
raising, a process of local raising of the quantifier determiner without its 
argument to a position that neutralizes the distinction between the first and 
the second argument set of the determiner (illustrated in (7a)).  
(7) a. [Qi [[XP ti NP] YP]] 
 b. [Twoi [[DP ti parrots ] are wearing a hat]] 
In (7a), the quantifier (Q) moves out of the quantified noun phrase. As a 
result, there is no difference anymore between the relation of the quantifier 
with its first argument and the relation with its second argument (cf. (7b)). 
This is similar to the semantic characterization of weak quantifiers in terms 
of symmetry (cf. (5)). Strong quantifiers still move by means of QR (à la 
May, 1985), according to which the entire quantified noun phrase 
(quantifier and NP) moves to the beginning of the sentence.1  
Now, recall that the switched reading is only possible with a weak 
quantifier. Since weak quantifiers are symmetrical and do not make a 
difference between its first and second argument set, the switched reading 
can not be explained in terms of the inherent characteristics of weak 
quantifiers. Therefore, Herburger claims that the switched reading results 
from “focal mapping”. Focused material in the domain of the determiner 
(the quantifier’s first argument) ends up as the second argument set and 
nonfocused material as the first argument set. In case of a strong quantifier, 
                                         
1 Despite the small notational difference between Q-raising and Quantifier Raising (or 
QR), note the important theoretical difference between these two raising operations. 
Following Herburger, we define Q-raising as raising of the quantifier determiner 
without its accompanying NP. This differs from the raising operation called Quantifier 
Raising (or QR) which involves raising of the entire DP, both quantifier and NP à la 
May, 1985) 
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focus on the first argument does not result in the switched reading since the 
syntax already dictates the order of the arguments (i.e. QR has been applied 
and the quantifier together with its first argument already moved to the 
beginning of the sentence).  
2.2. The switched reading as a special cardinal reading 
De Hoop and Sola (1995) argue against the view that (1b) is an instance of 
a switched reading of many’s arguments. They point at the role of a context 
set to explain the apparent inversion of many’s arguments. They crucially 
differ from Herburger (1997, 2001) in not predicting the switched reading 
to arise from focus on the NP. De Hoop and Sola (1995) argue that many’s 
first argument set intersects with some kind of context set of the expected 
or normal value of this set. This results in the switched reading in (8a) 
since surprisingly, as many as 14 Scandinavians had won the Nobel Prize 
in literature by 1984. This contradicts one’s normal expectations, given the 
fact that out of each country in the world, only one person can win the 
Nobel Prize in literature per year.  
(8) Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Price in literature 
 a.  Many winners of the Nobel Price in literature are 
Scandinvians 
2.3. The switched reading as a relative proportional reading 
Cohen (2001) argues for a similar approach in terms of alternative sets. 
Defining the switched reading as a relative proportional reading, he 
distinguishes the switched reading from the regular cardinal (1a) and the 
abstract proportional reading of many (9). 
(9) Many students got an A in my class 
For (9), one only has to inspect whether there are more students that got an 
A than the ones that did not. This abstract proportional reading, Cohen 
argues, differs only slightly from the switched reading, which he calls a 
‘relative proportional reading’. For a relative proportional reading, 
however, one also has to inspect the alternative sets of the first and second 
argument set of the quantifier. Example (1), for example, involves, 
according to Cohen (2001), a comparison between various countries with 
respect to the proportion of the population who have won the Tour de 
France. The sentence is true only if the proportion of Tour de France 
winners is greater in France than it is in any other country. Hence the term 
‘relative proportional reading’.  
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2.4 Intermediate summery 
In sum, all three accounts discussed above point at a different set that has 
to be taken into account to determine the truth-value of a switched reading. 
According to De Hoop and Sola it is the expected or normal frequency of a 
context set that the first arguments intersect with that explains the switched 
reading. Cohen points at the set of alternatives to the second argument set 
that has to be taken into account in order to get the switched reading. 
Herburger differs from both De Hoop and Sola and Cohen by arguing that 
the switched reading is an instance of a focus affected reading. She predicts 
to find more instances of switched reading if the NP is focused. As a result, 
all three accounts differ in the set comparison they assume that is necessary 
to interpret a switched reading.  
If the acquisition of quantification is the topic at hand, as it is in the 
present paper, the question arises what kind of set comparison the child 
actually computes and whether her set comparison reflects an adult way of 
interpreting quantifiers. There is only sparse data on children’s 
interpretation process of quantifiers, let alone on children’s interpretation 
process of weak quantifiers. Questioning children’s processing of 
quantification is a first step, we would like to argue, to a full understanding 
of children’s mental representation of quantifiers.2 In order to question 
children’s processing of quantifiers from the perspective of the literature on 
the switched reading discussed above, our study focused on children’s 
interpretation of the meaning of strong and weak quantified sentences in 
relation to focus and incorporates alternative sets of the argument of the 
quantifier in the design of the experiment and the ability to answer in terms 
of expectations of normal frequencies (cf. Hollebrandse, 2004 and the 
effect of focus on children’s interpretation of quantified sentences). But 
before turning to the experiment that addresses the question whether 
children allow such a switched reading for weak and strong quantifiers in 
the first place and second, what kind of set-comparison the child computes, 
we will discuss how the switched reading and the difference between weak 
and strong quantifiers relates to the acquisition of quantification.  
                                         
2 Off course, we agree with an anonymous reviewer who pointed out that “performance 
data supposedly represent mental representations”. Being outside the scope of the 
current paper, however, we leave the task to prove that performance data reveals 
children’s actual mental representations for further research. 
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3. Set comparison, focus and the acquisition of quantification 
Until now, research on the acquisition of quantification has mainly focused 
on strong quantifiers like all, every and each. However, two accounts make 
precise predictions for children’s understanding of weak quantifiers.  
Drozd & van Loosbroek (1999) suggest that children’s non-adult 
interpretations of universally quantified sentences result from their 
expectations of normal quantities. Along the lines of De Hoop and Sola’s 
(1995) explanations of the switched reading, Drozd and Van Loosbroek 
suggest that children also interpret strong quantifiers like all in terms of the 
expected or normal frequency of horse-riding cowboys. Put differently, 
they suggest that children interpret strong quantifier as weak existential 
ones. Furthermore, Drozd and Van Loosbroek predict that children, when 
the first argument set is salient or discourse active, apply an adult-like 
reading. When the first argument set is not in focus, children will switch 
the arguments of both a strong and a weak quantifier. Drozd and Van 
Loosbroek refer to this as the Weak Quantification Hypothesis. 
Hollebrandse and Smits (2006) argue that children always try to fill in 
the two argument sets of a quantifier and randomly pick a set to do so. This 
explains their findings that Dutch children always prefer a strong reading 
of the Dutch quantifier allemaal, even when it appears in an existential 
there-sentence (which only allows a weak reading of allemaal for adults). 
Put differently, they found that children interpreted (10) as (11). We refer 
to Hollebrandse and Smits’s hypothesis as the Rigid Mapping Hypothesis. 
 (10)  Er vliegen allemaal papegaaien 
There flying many parrots 
There are flying many parrots 
(11)  De papegaaien vliegen allemaal 
The parrots fly all 
The parrots are all flying 
How does this relate to Drozd and Van Loosbroek’s (1999) Weak 
Quantification Hypothesis? Drozd and Van Loosbroek predict that focus on 
the second argument results in a switched reading. The Rigid Mapping 
Hypothesis, however, predicts that children prefer a strong reading of the 
quantifier anyway. Put differently, Hollebrandse and Smits predict that 
focus on either the first or second argument set does not affect the 
children’s interpretation of a quantified sentence. In the next section, we 
discuss the experiment that tests these predictions. 
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4. Experiment: the acquisition of many and all 
The main goal of the experiment is to compare children’s interpretation of 
weak versus strong quantifiers, in particular many versus all. The starting 
point is that, while all is a strong, non-symmetrical quantifier and never can 
get a switched reading, many is a weak, symmetrical quantifier which can 
get the switched reading next to a cardinal (1a) and a proportional (9) 
reading. We want to find out, first, whether children master the ambiguity 
of many or only allow one of these three readings (in particular whether 
they only allow the switched reading as predicted by the Weak 
Quantification Hypothesis) and second, whether children interpret the 
strong quantifiers many of and all in a similar way as they interpret many. 
As described in the previous section, the literature concerning the 
actual nature of the switched reading points at either the expected 
frequency of the first argument of the quantifier (De Hoop and Sola, 1995) 
or the set of alternatives of the first and second argument set (Cohen, 
2001). In addition, Herburger (1997, 2001) points at the relation between 
focus and the switched readings. These three explanations of the switched 
reading are respectively accounted for in the design of the experiment by 
(i) enabling children to explain their answer in terms of the expected 
frequency of the first argument set by using the setup as described below 
(see ‘procedure’), (ii) displaying the set of alternatives of the first and 
second argument set in the experimental test situation (see ‘materials’), and 
(iii) introducing the test items in terms of making either the first or the 
second argument set more salient (see ‘materials’). We also ran the 
experiment on adults, in order to confirm this latter effect experimentally.  
4.1. Method 
Subjects 
We tested 28 children between the ages of 4;1 and 7;3 (mean age 6;0). Six 
children were excluded from further analysis because they didn’t answer 
the control items correctly, suggesting that they did not pay attention or did 
not understand the task. All the children were recruited at preschools in the 
area of Amherst, Massachusetts (USA). We also tested a control group of 
17 adult native speakers of English. They were all undergraduate students 
at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst (USA). 
Procedure 
The children were tested using a Truth Value Judgment Task that slightly 
differed from the classical Truth-value Judgment Task (Crain and 
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Thornton, 1998); instead of introducing a blindfolded puppet to the child, 
the experimenter told the child the following story: 
 
At the university, I have built this computer and as you will see, there 
are a lot of pictures on it, but it is also able to play sentences via those 
speakers! But the problem is, I don’t know whether I build this 
computer entirely the right way. So, I need your help to check whether 
the computer has been built the right way or the wrong way. Do you 
want to help me? OK, well, I show you the pictures I have got on this 
computer and when I will show you a picture, you will also hear 
something. Now, if you just want to tell me if this matches the picture 
or not. All right? 
A laptop was used to present the pictures and two separate speakers were 
used to play prerecorded test items. The test items were either presented in 
a context that forced a switched reading of the quantifier or a non-switched 
reading (see materials). Then the experimenter said “Let’s hear what the 
computer says” and subsequently asked the child to press a button on the 
keyboard. As illustrated in the introduction story above, the child was 
instructed to check whether the pictures matched the sentences or not. This 
instruction was given to prevent children from answering in terms of 
world-knowledge (e.g. “parrots do not wear hats in the real world, so the 
picture is not right”). Next to this question, this setup crucially allowed us 
to also ask the child to explain her answer (being either ‘yes’ or ‘no’), 
either in terms of her expectations, proportions or alternative sets of the 
first and second argument set. 
Materials  
Westerståhl’s observation regarding the ambiguity of many was the starting 
point for the design of the pictures. In addition to this and following Cohen 
(2001), next to the set of individuals denoted by the noun phrase and the 
verb phrase, the alternative set of the first argument set and the alternative 
set of the second argument set was depicted. In the case of the test sentence 
Many parrots are wearing hats, this meant that, next to the set of parrots, 
also other animals (the alternative set of the quantifier’s first argument) 
were depicted and, next to the set of parrots wearing hats, also other hat-
wearers (the alternative set of the quantifier’s second argument set). 
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Figure 4:  All parrots are wearing hats 
 
The scenarios were used to test the children’s comprehension of sentences 
containing the different types of quantifiers: many, many of or all. The 
setup of the picture that was used in the case of a sentence containing all 
(Figure 4) differed from the setup of the pictures that was used in the case 
of sentences containing many or many of (Figure 3). This was done so, 
because this enabled the child with a preference for a switched reading to 
say yes for Figure 3 (since many hat-wearers are parrots) and no for Figure 
4 (since not all hat-wearers are parrots). The children were shown pictures 
along the lines of Figure 3 accompanied with a sentence containing many 
(six times) and many of (six times) and six times accompanied with a 
sentence containing all. See for an overview of all testitems the appendix. 
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In addition to the effect of Quantifier Type, the effect of Focus was tested 
by varying the introduction to each picture. The description either 
backgrounded the first argument set of the quantifier or the second 
argument set; the experimenter pointed at the set of individuals denoted by 
the verb phrase (indicated by the dashed oval in Figures 3 and 4 above, 
which resulted in focus on the first argument set) or at the set of individuals 
denoted by the noun phrase (indicated by the black oval in Figures 3 and 4 
above, which resulted in focus on the second argument set). Following 
Herburger (1997, 2001), we take adults to answer ‘no’ in the case of a 
backgrounded NP (establishing focus on the VP) in Figure 3 for a sentence 
like Many parrots are wearing hats (due to a weak, symmetrical reading). 
Conversely, we hypothese adults to answer ‘yes’ in the case of a 
backgrounded VP (establising focus on the NP) in Figure 3 for a sentence 
like Many parrots are wearing hats (due to a switched reading).3 For 
Figure 4, we hypothesize adults to answer ‘yes’ no matter which set is 
backgrounded. 
Our experiment crucially involved gestural focus instead of 
intonational focus to achieve joint focus of attention. We take gestural 
focus to be a natural and important extension of intonational focus as a way 
of achieving joint focus of attention (cf. psychological work that shows that 
“pointing gestures circumscribe a referential domain by directing gaze to 
an approximate spatial region” (Bangerter, 2004:415; cf. references 
therein)).  We takes this to be a natural extension of intonational focus 
because it extends the concept to pointing.4  
                                         
3 As we agree with two anonymous reviewers, it might be hard to get a ‘yes’ answer for 
Many parrots are wearing hats in relation to picture 3 without gestural focus. Crucially, 
however, by pointing at the set of hat-wearers, only part of the figure is brought under 
the attention, and, as one reviewer admits, “the ‘yes’ answer gets very easily triggered”. 
4 Moreover, it is known that children have problems understanding intonational focus 
but do understand the mechanism of pointing as a mean to establish joint attention 
between speaker and hearer. Children’s understanding of pointing is confirmed in our 
experiment; all the children showed joint attention to the set the experimenter pointed 
out. Furthermore, all the children were able to point out the displayed objects when 
asked to do so. As a result, most children also explained their answers by either 
describing or pointing out the set relevant for their answer. This indicated that they 
master the mechanism of gestural focus to achieve joint attention. After the 
experimenter established this kind of joint attention on either the first or second 
argument set by means of gestural focus, we played the test sentence. As a result, the 
test sentence either contained a contrastive topic or not (i.e. the subject of the test 
sentence was either the set which we did or did not point out in the introduction story). 
We call this kind of contrastive focus simply ‘focus’ in the remainder of this paper.  
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Two control items using many and all were tested. In the control items, a 
sentence with many and all was used in combination with a picture in 
which respectively only e.g. one parrot was wearing a hat (triggering a ‘no’ 
answer) or e.g. four parrots were all wearing a hat (triggering a ‘yes’ 
answer).  
4.2. Results 
Set comparison and quantification 
Do children process the meaning of quantified sentences, i.e. do they 
compute the set comparison that is necessary for understanding quantified 
sentences in an adult way? According to Drozd and Van Loosbroek’s 
Weak Quantification Hypothesis, children prefer a switched reading. The 
Rigid Mapping Hypothesis (Hollebrandse and Smits, 2006) predicts that 
children analyze the quantifier as a strong, non-symmetrical quantifier. 
Recall that the children were asked to explain their judgments. These 
explanations allowed us to analyze the child’s interpretation, i.e. processing 
of the meaning of many, many of and all; in terms of regular counting 
(cardinality), in terms of proportionality, or in terms of the switched 
reading. Or, to put it differently, the children’s explanations enabled us to 
answer the question whether the different readings of many that have been 
proposed in the literature (Partee, 1988) are also given by children for 
strong quantifiers like all and many of.  
The results show that this is indeed the case. Each child gave all three 
readings across Quantifier Type (no child consistently gave one of the three 
readings for either a weak or a strong quantifier). Example (12) illustrates a 
case of a child (shown a picture similar in setup to Figure 4, but also 
displaying two other birds with yellow wings) getting the switched reading 
(which is only possible with weak quantifiers for adults) for the strong 
quantifier all. 
(12) child Ca. (age: 6;4.23)  
 Computer: All parrots have yellow wings 
 Child: No. 
 Experimenter: Why not? 
 Child: That’s why: all of the characters have yellow wings 
In (12), the child explains her answer in terms of the second argument set 
of the quantifier (all entities that have yellow wings). Put differently, the 
child quantifies over the intersection of the set of characters that have 
yellow wings and the set of parrots and then checks whether there are no 
ERIK-JAN SMITS, TOM ROEPER, BART HOLLEBRANDSE 
199 
characters that have yellow wings outside this intersection. However, this is 
not the case; the picture also contains other characters that have yellow 
wings (cf. the child’s description of the picture in the last line of (12)). 
Consequently, we take the child’s reading of all as being an example of a 
switched reading of the arguments of the quantifier. 
This switched reading of the arguments of the quantifier differs from 
non-switched answers. The example in (13) illustrates a case of a child 
(shown a picture similar in setup to Figure 3) giving a proportional reading 
of many. 
(13) Child Si. (age: 5;8.15)  
 Computer: Many girls are holding balloons 
 Child: No! Many girls are NOT holding balloons 
In (13), the child refers to the first argument set (i.e. the set of girls) to 
explain her answer. Moreover, the child points out that many girls are not 
holding balloons; she quantifies over the first argument set of the quantifier 
and checks whether this counts as many. She concludes that this is not the 
case; many girls are not holding balloons (i.e. 20 girls) which is more than 
the girls that are holding balloons (i.e. 5 girls). 
In addition to switched and proportional readings, children gave 
cardinal answers. A case of a child (shown a picture similar in setup to 
Figure 3) giving a cardinal reading is illustrated in (14).  
(14) Child Sh. (age: 7;2.20)  
 Computer: Many of the dogs have red tails 
 Child: Yes 
 Experimenter: That’s true? OK. Why is that? 
 Child: Because there is more than one. 
We called the answer of the child a cardinal reading (cf. (14)) if the child 
explained her answer by referring to a certain number (e.g. more than one 
of the dogs have red tails).5  
If we look at the distribution of the different answers, we see that 
switched readings were given in 10% of all answers, 24% were 
proportional  answers and 49% were cardinal answers. 16% of the answers 
were labeled as ‘other’ (answers in terms of world-knowledge). Only two 
times, a child answered in terms of the alternative set of the first arguments 
                                         
5 We labeled an answer a ‘cardinal answer’  if the child answered either in terms of 
some kind of abstract cardinality (i.e. “because many is more than one”) or in terms of 
pointing and an answer like “because there are five of them”.  
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set (i.e. other animals) and pointed at the animals not wearing a hat. 
However, since this was not totally straightforward, we labeled these 
answers also ‘other’. Figure 5 shows how these different types of readings 
were distributed over the three different quantifiers. The different quantifier 
types many, many of and all are mapped on the x-axis and the mean given 
answer types (in percentages) on the y-axis. The bars show the percentages 
of switched, proportional, cardinal and other readings. 


















The children’s explanations were analyzed in a repeated measures analysis 
of variance. Within-subjects factors were Quantifier Type (many, many of 
and all) and Answer Type (Switched reading, Proportional reading, 
Cardinal reading and other reading). This analysis shows a main effect of 
Quantifier Type (F(3,63) = 9.697, p < .001) within-subjects and an 
interaction effect between Quantifier Type and Answer Type (F(6.126) = 
6.62, p < .001). T-tests show that this is mainly due to all; the children gave 
significantly more cardinal answers for all (69%) versus many (40%) and 
all versus many of (41%). (Significant differences exist between all and 
many (t(16) = -2.33, p = .033), on the one hand, and between all and many 
of, on the other (t(16) = -2.33, p = .033).  There is no significant difference 





























































































Focus affected quantification 
Focus was varied in the introductory description. Focus was either on the 
first argument set (NP) or the second argument set (VP) of the determiner. 
But are subjects sensitive to focus? The Rigid Mapping Hypothesis predicts 
that the children will not show an effect of focus. The Weak Quantification 
Hypothesis predicts that children will accept more switched readings if the 
VP is focused.  
In order to test the effect of focus, we need to examine the proportional 
readings and the switched readings in detail, and check how children 
compared the sets. Leaving out now the cardinal and the proportional 
answers, figure 6 presents the number of switched answers per focus type. 
The different quantifiers are mapped on the x-axis. The number of switched 
readings is mapped on the y-axis. The bars show the frequency of switched 
readings for either focus on the NP or focus on the VP. 











The switched answers were then compared with the proportional (non-
switched) answers and analyzed in a 2 x 2 x 3 repeated measures analysis 
of variance. Within-subjects factors were Answer Type (Switched readings 
and Non-Switched readings), Focus Type (Focus NP and Focus VP) and 
Quantifier Type (Many, many of and all). There was no effect of focus.  
As a second step, we tested the effect of focus by looking at the mean 
yes answer of both adults and children. Recall that, according to a switched 
reading of the arguments of the quantifier, one would answer “yes” with 
respect to the pictures that accompanied sentences containing many or 
many of, and “no” with respect to the pictures that accompanied all. The 
results contradict the prediction that children prefer a switched reading 
depending on focus type; for many and many of, the children’s answers 
only consist of respectively 47% and 43% of yes-answers, for all, they 
answered ‘yes’ in 86% of the cases. This is visualized in figure 7 in which 
the conditions many, many of and all are mapped on the x-axis versus the 
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mean for yes-answers (in percentages) on the y-axis for children (left 
graph) and adults (right graph). 
Figure 7: proportion of mean yes answers for Quantifier Type and Focus for children 
(left) and adults (right) 
  
 
The adults seem to prefer a switched reading for many if the NP is focused; 
a 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measure of analysis (within-subjects factors were 
Quantifier type (Many, Many of and All) and Focus type (Focus NP and 
Focus VP), between-subjects factor was Group (adult and child)) reveals an 
interaction effect for Quantifier type * Focus type * Group (F(2,74) = 
3.489, p = .036). Moreover, a t-test (two-sided) reveals a (nearly) 
significant difference between adults (73% yes answers) and children (47% 
yes answers) for many (t(37) = -1.90, p < .065) for focus on the NP.  
Further analysis by means of two-sided t-tests (see Table 1) shows a 
significant difference between many and all and many of and all for both 
adults and children across focus type. No difference is found for both 
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t df Sig. (2 
tailed) 
Many – Many of 10,20 2,17 1,74 21 ,10 
Many - All 51,83 11,05 -3,56 21 ,00* 
Children 
  
  Many of - All 51,35 10,95 -3,94 21 ,00* 
Many – Many of 14,71 3,57 ,82 16 ,42 
Many - All 43,35 10,51 -2,33 16 ,03* 
Adults 
  
  Many of – All 48,57 11,78 -2,33 16 ,03* 
* Significant at the p < .05 level 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Despite current suggestions in the literature that the semantics of weak 
quantifiers, and the switched reading of many in particular, might be the 
key for understanding children’s non-adult-like interpretations of 
quantified sentences, literature on the acquisition of quantification has 
failed to address the semantics and acquisition of weak quantifiers like 
many. This paper aimed to take into account the different semantic 
solutions that have been proposed to explain the switched reading of many 
and to identify its relevance for the acquisition of quantification. The 
experiment presented in the previous section and the analysis of the 
children’s answers enable us to do so.  
Our results show that children are capable of carrying out all three 
kinds of set comparisons, i.e. they allow weak, cardinal, proportional and 
switched readings. Although the design of the experiment opened up for it, 
the children gave no answers in terms of the set of alternatives of the first 
and second arguments set of the quantifiers (as predicted by Cohen, 2001). 
Nor did the children answer in terms of expected set sizes, which might be 
due to the instruction of the test (see the section entitled ‘procedure’). But 
the children also allowed, next to the strong reading also a weak, cardinal 
reading even when the (adult) syntax does not allow such a reading (e.g. in 
the case of many of and all). This is in line with findings by Krämer (2005a 
and 2005b).  
The results indicate that children do not prefer a reading of the 
quantifier but randomly pick a set as the first argument of a quantifier. 
Children do this even when the syntactic environment (i.e. focus) dictated 
them to pick a particular set. This supports the Rigid Mapping Hypothesis 
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(Hollebrandse and Smits, 2006). As such, an analysis in terms of the 
syntactic and semantic characteristics of weak and strong quantifiers 
provides an explanation which is more  adequate than the pure reliance 
upon the Weak Quantifier Hypothesis proposed by Drozd and Van 
Loosebrook, which suggests that the object must be the basis of a 
proportional reading. Our hypothesis and evidence show children have all 
three possible forms: cardinal (weak), proportional (strong) and switched 
(strong) readings. 6 
The cardinal reading requires no comparison. Where a comparison is 
required, we argue that children assume the presence of two sets that are 
connected.  What is left open is which set is primary and which designates 
a subset: 
   
Q(A,B) => fill in both 
 
If the subject set is primary, then the object-set is a subset.  If the object set 
is primary, then the subject involves a subset.  This comparison requires a 
syntax whereby both subject and object are within the scope of the 
quantifier. A Focus operation, raising just the quantifier, proposed by 
Herburger (1997, 2001), achieves this by putting both subject and object in 
the c-command domain of the quantifier.  The focus-raising analysis fits 
the facts of both intonational and gestural focus. While it might require a 
period of time before children determine intonational focus, or even 
gestural focus, it is possible that the children have a default or arbitrary 
focus, sensitive to contextual salience (of any kind?), which allows them to 
focus either the subject or the object. Put differently, we argue, in line with 
Herburger (1997, 2001) that the weak, cardinal reading of many differs 
from the strong, switched reading in terms of the underlying movement 
operations. Weak quantifiers move by means of Q-raising (as defined by 
Herburger, i.e. the quantifier moves without its argument), strong 
quantifiers move by means of QR (as defined by among others May 
(1985), i.e. the quantifier moves together with its argument to the 
beginning of the sentence). Our results show that children, unlike adults, 
allow Q-raising for a strong quantifier (i.e. in the case of many of and all). 
                                         
6 Drozd and Van Loosbroek (1999) called their account the ‘Weak Quantification 
Hypothesis’. We take this label only to refer to the fact that the switched reading (which 
Drozd and Van Loosbroek hypothesize to be the children’s preferred interpretation) is 
only possible with weak quantifiers like many and few. However, it does not make clear 
that the switched reading is a reading for which you have to do more than just look at 
the intersection of the first and second argument set. In that sense, we call the switched 
reading a strong reading. 
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This indicates that children initially have an ambiguous quantifier system. 
They allow both Q-raising and Quantifier Raising for weak and strong 
quantifiers.  
In sum, this paper shows that the child has to learn to distinguish 
between quantifiers that make a distinction between the two arguments 
they quantify and those quantifiers that do not. Only by doing so will the 
child be able to compare sets in an adult-like manner. In this process, the 
child has to learn that weak quantifiers are unary and move by means of 
Quantifier Raising while strong quantifiers move by means of Q-raising. 
The child that allows these two movement operations for both weak and 
strong quantifiers permits an ambiguity in her grammar that is incompatible 
with the adult grammar. We suggest that, in the end (in the course of 
development?), the incompatibility with the target grammar will lead the 
child to restructure her grammar to ensure that many of and all can move 
by means of QR only.  
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Appendix 
Items with all 
All boys are reading books 
All doctors are carrying bags 
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All parrots are wearing hats 
All girls are holding balloons 
All parrots have yellow wings 
All dogs have red tails 
 
Items with many 
Many monkeys are eating bananas 
Many girls are holding balloons 
Many parrots have yellow wings 
Many parrots are wearing hats 
Many boys are reading books 
Many men are lifting boxes 
 
Items with many of 
Many of the dogs have red tails 
Many of the dolphins are holding bones 
Many of the donkeys are carrying girls 
Many of the businessmen are carrying donkeys 
Many of the doctors are carrying bags 
Many of the dogs have green noses 
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